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Even though the notion of world obviously plays an important role in the history of 
philosophy, its proper conceptualisations often get lost among its functioning simply as a 
synonym for reality, objectivity or totality. Just as the concept of dog does not bark, 
“world” as concept is not as big as the world itself. Roland Végső’s book Worldlessness 
After Heidegger shows us that the world is not enough: What the concept of world brings 
to light is neither real nor is it everything. 
While many studies indeed exist on how certain philosophers and philosophies 
(e.g., Husserl and Heidegger, possible worlds in analytic philosophy) have made world 
one of their central concepts, comparative studies that follow the transformations of the 
concept of world through different epochs or traditions of thought remain rare.1 Végső’s 
book contributes to filling this gap by devoting its five chapters to Heidegger, Arendt, 
Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis, Derrida (and through his reading, Husserl), and 
Badiou. Such a “Comparative” reading of different authors and traditions of thought is 
only possible, however, if one manages to identify a problem that can be shown to be 
common to them all, even if their various solutions differ greatly. This common problem 
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is the problem of worldlessness that, according to Végső, in one way or another 
underpins the way the notion of world is conceptualised in the work of these thinkers. 
Worldlessness After Heidegger thus presents the concept of world in the rear-view 
mirror, from the perspective of moving past it towards the realms of worldlessness. 
Worldlessness, for Végső, is not a post-apocalyptic condition.2 In fact, the book’s 
main objective is to argue against the conception that the world is somehow on the verge 
of being lost and the task at hand is to save or restore it. The point is rather to present 
the concept of world as a philosophical delusion that we should move beyond. Instead of 
seeing worldlessness as a privative state or a return to some primordial chaos, Végső 
suggests to explore various forms of ontological, phenomenological and political 
worldlessness. This is the major project the book announces, although its aim is not to 
realise it. Rather, its ambition is to lay the ground for it by exposing worldlessness as the 
truth of 20th century continental thought’s struggles with the concept of world. 
Végső identifies worldlessness as “the continuous undercurrent” and even “the 
disavowed center of contemporary thought.”3 The paradoxical problem that has affected 
much of the post-war continental philosophy is that worldlessness is constitutive of any 
construction of a world, both ontologically (being cannot be reduced to the world) and 
phenomenologically (what conditions our experience as the experience of a world is not 
itself “worldly”). Beyond the concept of world, there is thus the structural necessity of 
worldlessness. On the other hand, however, worldlessness is also perceived as a 
historical crisis that comes with modernity (in the guise of modern science and/or 
capitalism) and threatens to undermine the world as the framework of genuine 
experience. There is thus a tension between the structural and the historical 
worldlessness, whereby the historical threat overshadows the structural dimension, 
even though the latter clearly points to worldlessness as the real beyond our 
construction of experience. Faced with the structural “abyss” of worldlessness, the 
philosophers analysed by Végső decided not to explore it but rather to cling to the world 
as an ethical and political task. 
As the title of Végső’s book suggests, phenomenology is at the origin of this 
problem that gets its paradigmatic elaboration with Heidegger, but extends even to those 
who have been critical towards his philosophy. The book’s strongest trait is the detailed 
and precise analysis of how the paradoxical conundrum of world and worldlessness 
plays out in the phenomenological tradition, including not only the different stages of 
Heidegger’s work, but also Arendt and her more political exposition of the problem, and 
the way Derrida deconstructs the Husserlian and the Heideggerian concept of world only 
to himself insist on the imperative to act as if the world existed. 
 Végső’s endeavour is not, however, limited to the path from phenomenology to 
deconstruction. On the one hand, it moves outside philosophy to include psychoanalysis, 
while on the other, it leaves behind phenomenology in the strict sense to inspect the role 
of the concept of world in Badiou’s philosophical system. 
 Psychoanalysis fits Végső’s trajectory perfectly, since, as he demonstrates, the 
discovery of the unconscious “is a discovery of the primacy of worldlessness.”4 The 
existence of the unconscious challenges the phenomenological assumption of the 
worldly nature of experience, the evidence of being-in-the-world. Even though 
psychoanalysis may pathologise certain forms of worldlessness (the loss of reality), it 
also shows that what is really pathological is the assuredness of world-constructions 
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which in fact make up for this loss. What Végső has in mind here is not only Freud’s 
critique of the Weltanschauung but also his and Lacan’s discussions of psychotic world-
construction. Psychoanalysis is important for Végső because it shows that what is 
beyond the world (the unconscious) is immanently structured and that these structures 
are what determines the formation of worlds. The primacy of worldlessness has far 
reaching implications for thought itself. Both Freud and Lacan draw parallels between 
psychotic constructions and speculative thinking. As Lacan often points out, the concept 
of world is an obsolete philosophical phantasy, which modern science discarded a long 
time ago. 
 Things get more complicated when Végső turns his attention to Badiou. As he 
rightly emphasises, Badiou’s central work Being and Event is one of the prime examples 
of the philosophy of worldlessness.5 Both being (in its presentation as inconsistent 
multiplicity) and event (as that which breaks with any consistency this multiplicity might 
form) are essentially worldless. Végső does not mention this, but Badiou is here clearly 
under the influence of Lacan, as when he states: “Philosophy begins by destroying the 
very concept of the world; it knows, as does Lacan, that there only is a fantasy of the 
world, and that it is only in its defection, or its defeat, that one can subtractively think 
some real.”6 Why, then, does Badiou return to the concept of world in spectacular fashion 
in Logics of Worlds, Being and Event’’s sequel?7 
Végső, of course, provides a solid account of the reasoning Badiou provides and 
which we cannot enter here in detail. Simply put, worlds are transcendental structures 
according to which the ontological multiples appear. Thus, Badiou’s rehabilitation of the 
concept of world does not simply discard worldlessness. Being is still worldless while 
the event remains that which pierces through the consistency of the world and gives rise 
to “transworldly” truths. The way worldlessness both conditions and makes impossible 
any coherence of a world is not disavowed by Badiou as it is by phenomenology. On the 
contrary, it is something that his philosophy openly builds on. 
However, Végső can still use the book’s central critical argument against Badiou’s 
denunciations of the worldlessness of capitalism and the political imperative to act as if 
we all live in the same world, which Badiou proclaims in his other works. The political 
motivation Végső himself gives for preferring worldlessness over “saving the world” is 
that today, the “neoliberal finance capital appears to run on the very values of 
phenomenological world-formation,” promising an infinity of possible worlds.8 The 
opposition to this, on the contrary, proceeds through “the invention of new forms of 
worldlessness.”9 In Logics of Worlds, nevertheless, the multitude of worlds is where 
Badiou places the event and the subjective procedure of truth. Could we thus say, 
instead, that that the resistance to capitalist world-formation could also proceed through 
the invention of new forms of world-formation? 
Végső cannot condone Badiou’s return to the concept of world although he is 
sympathetic to the way Badiou defines the logics of worlds as transcendental indexing of 
the ontological multiplicity. Since Badiou’s concept of world does not disavow 
worldlessness, it is, according to Végső, already worldless in all but name.  
In fact, transcendental indexing could be used to describe the structures of 
worldlessness themselves (which might even be more consistent with Badiou’s 
worldless ontology), which would turn the logics of worlds into the logics of 
worldlessness. As I have already mentioned, Végső does not attempt here to produce a 
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positive ontology (or phenomenology) of worldlessness, which is why his seeming 
endorsement of Badiou’s concept of the transcendental is all the more telling (he also 
points to the new realisms of Marcus Gabriel, Levi R. Bryant and Timothy Morton to give 
an indication of where this might lead us). 
But if the analysis of Badiou shows that “it is the fiction of the world that reveals 
the real immanent organisational structures of worldlessness,”10 then we may reverse 
Végső’s question to Badiou and direct it back at him: Why do we need to call 
worldlessness something that is perfectly well described as world? Végső does not 
provide a precise definition of the world which is apparently in opposition with 
worldlessness, which allows him to compare various conceptualisations of the notion in 
different thinkers, but this approach also excludes the possibility of a radically different 
concept of world, one that would no longer be subject to the same form of criticism. Is 
the concept of world the same when it refers to the cosmological totality or the 
phenomenological framework of experience as it is within the Badiousian coexistent 
multiplicity of worlds? Due to the focus on worldlessness, the problem of the multiplicity 
of worlds and the different types of world-formation that it might suggest remains 
largely unexplored, which is not per se a critique of Végső, who carries his project out 
with impressive coherence, but more a suggestion for another way to explore the 
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